Security-Fidelity Tradeoffs: The Hidden Cost of Prompt Injection Defense
SecFid reveals that prompt-injection defenses can gain security by suppressing untrusted text, trading away fidelity on tasks that must preserve it.
PhD student in Computer Science, Siebel School of Computing and Data Science at UIUC
Evaluation, language model security, and deployment reliability.
Selected work
SecFid reveals that prompt-injection defenses can gain security by suppressing untrusted text, trading away fidelity on tasks that must preserve it.
A study of how language models handle conflicts between learned programming knowledge and prompt-provided updates, with probes and activation steering for code generation.
About
I am a PhD student in Computer Science at the Siebel School of Computing and Data Science, advised by Professor Haohan Wang.
My current work studies language model security and evaluation. SecFid examines the tradeoff between security and fidelity in prompt-injection defenses. That's Deprecated studies how language models respond when prompts conflict with learned programming knowledge.
Before Illinois, I studied computer science, statistics, and mathematics at the University of Iowa.